Recent results from anatomical, physiological and imaging experiments cast doubt on the existence of some areas in the primate visual brain and call for a much overdue re-assessment of what is a conceptually highly unsatisfactory view of how the primate visual brain is organized, a view that has survived more or less unscathed for at least 15 years and has been embraced uncritically by a significant element in the human brain imaging community. That view can be summarized as follows: that there are areas in the visual brain that represent only one quadrant of the visual field, leaving the other quadrant of the hemifield unrepresented, or represented in another area, leading to what Jon Kaas has called 'improbable areas'. It is not the improbability of such a view that is surprising; rather, it is its ready acceptance on the basis of questionable evidence.
The right half of the visual field is represented in the left brain hemisphere, and vice versa, the two separate representations being unified by a commissure that links the two cerebral hemispheres, the corpus callosum (Fig. 1) . The discovery of many visual areas in the brain [1] [2] [3] [4] with the promise of more to come, naturally raises the question of which criteria should be used in conferring the status of a visual area on a cortical zone. Two obvious ones are that an area should be activated by visual stimuli and should have an independent and more or less complete map of the contralateral visual field, to include both the upper and lower quadrants. This is so, even if a given quadrant, or part of the retina, claims a disproportionately large space in a cortical area, as happens even at the level of the primary visual cortex (V1). To this can be added other features, such as a distinct set of anatomical (including callosal) connections, identifiable and unique functional properties [1] and a distinctive architecture, although the search for the latter has not always been fruitful. In 1986, Van Essen's group [5] proposed a radical departure from this list by purporting to show that one of the areas constituting the visual brain, area V3, does not have a complete representation of the visual field, as had been supposed from earlier anatomical studies [6, 7] . Instead, they conceived of this area, which occupies a narrow strip anterior to area V2 (Figs 1 and 2) as consisting of two different areas -a dorsal one called V3 and a ventral one known as 'VP' -each representing one quadrant only of the contralateral hemifield. They proposed this even though the retinotopic map in 'VP' in both the human [8 -10] and the monkey [3,11] is a mirror image of that in upper V3 (Fig. 1) . The separation into two distinct areas was based on the supposition that lower V3, unlike its upper counterpart, not only lacks a direct anatomical input from V1, but also has a high proportion of colourselective cells [5] . The implication was obvious: 'VP' is an area registering activity only in the upper contralateral quadrant, without the capacity to register the same activity (including, above all, colour) when it occurs in the lower contralateral quadrant -or leaving it to some other improbable area, one registering activity in lower quadrant alone, to do so. This, in turn, leads to the supposition that there could be other improbable areas in which only one quadrant of the visual field is represented (Fig. 3) . This is odd: psychophysical experiments have shown that some attributes are more readily perceived when presented in one quadrant than in another [12, 13] , but none has ever shown that an attribute can be perceived only when presented in one quadrant alone.
In fact, the evidence against such improbable areas in the visual brain is mounting. The notion that there is an asymmetrical anatomical input from V1 to upper and lower V3 was questioned years ago, when it was shown that there is a direct input from V1 to lower V3 in Cebus 
